Alastair Langtry

Abstract

When a government makes many different policy decisions, lobbying can be viewed as a contest between the government and many different special interest groups. The government fights lobbying by interest groups with its own political capital. In this world, we find that a government wants to `sell protection' -- give favourable treatment in exchange for contributions -- to certain interest groups. It does this in order to build its own `war chest' of political capital, which improves its position in fights with other interest groups. And it does so until it wins all remaining contests with certainty. This stands in contrast to existing models that often view lobbying as driven by information or agency problems. 

Abstract

Keeping up with “The Joneses” matters. This paper examines a model of reference dependent choice where reference points are determined by social comparisons. An increase in the strength of social comparisons, even by only a few agents, increases consumption and decreases welfare for everyone. Strikingly, a higher marginal cost of consumption can increase welfare. In a labour market, social comparisons with co-workers create a big fish in a small pond effect, inducing incomplete labour market sorting. Further, it is the skilled workers with the weakest social networks who are induced to give up income to become the big fish. 

Abstract

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic led to an unprecedented rise in the use of social distancing as a means to curb the spread of infection. We examine the effectiveness of fines and informational messages (nudges) in promoting social distancing in a framed web-based interactive experiment conducted during the first wave of the pandemic on a near-representative sample of the US population. Fines promote distancing, while nudges have a smaller and less robust impact. Individuals do more social distancing when they are aware they are a superspreader. Using an instrumental variable approach, we show suggestive evidence that progressives are more likely to practice distancing, and they are somewhat more responsive to fines.

Abstract

We show that gambling style behaviour is important in politics: politicians ‘gamble for re-election’ in the context of a political leader selection. We exploit unique access to leaked information on MPs’ individual decisions in the 2021 leadership election of Germany’s centre-right parties. MPs are more likely to vote for a riskier candidate when facing lower re-election chances. These results match the predictions derived from our model of rational risk-taking. Gambling for re-election shows that MPs trade off leaders’ expected quality against their riskiness. It provides a new explanation for intra-party dissent, and rationalises why parties may choose low quality leaders.

Abstract

This paper adapts ideas from social identity theory to set out a new framework for modelling conspicuous consumption. Agents derive status from their own conspicuous consumption and from belonging to an identity group with high conspicuous consumption. Importantly, these two sources of status are substitutes. Agents also feel pressure to conform with their neighbours in a network. This framework can rationalise a set of seemingly conflicting stylised facts about conspicuous consumption that are currently explained by different families of models. In addition, our model delivers new testable predictions regarding the effect of network structure and income inequality on conspicuous consumption.

Abstract

This paper presents a new rationale for a self-interested economic elite voluntarily extending property rights. When agents make endogenous investment decisions, there is a commitment problem. Ex-post, the elite face strong incentives to expropriate investments from the non-elite (who don’t have property rights), which dissuades investment. Extending property rights to new groups can resolve this problem, even for those not given property rights, by making public good provision more attractive to the elite. Unlike other models of franchise extensions, extending property rights in this paper does not involve the elite ceding control to others. Rather, it changes the incentives they face. Additionally, adding identity groups to the model shows that an elite faces weaker incentives to resolve the commitment problem when it is part of a minority identity – identity fragmentation makes it harder for a society to extend property rights.

Abstract

This paper studies the general class of games where agents: (1) are embedded on a network, (2) have two possible actions, and (3) these actions are strategic complements. We use a measure of network cohesiveness – the k-core – to provide a novel characterisation of the equilibria. After transforming the network appropriately, the k-core fully describes both the minimal and maximal equilibria, and also provides a partial characterisation of all others. This framework is also the binary action version of the large class of network games with strategic complements and continuous actions.

Abstract

This paper examines how social networks affect the provision of public goods within a community. Here, networks spread information about whether people contribute to a public good. This can generate incentives for cooperative behaviour (in the form of contributions to a public good) without repeated interactions. We find a critical threshold in network connectivity at which the level of public good provision changes sharply. This threshold is common to everyone, even though people are heterogeneous in terms of how costly they find it to provide public goods and in their network position. Small changes to the incentives to create links can therefore cause large falls in public good provision - even when changes have no apparent connection to public goods.

Abstract

Contact tracing and quarantine programs have been one of the leading Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions against COVID-19. Some governments have relied on mandatory programs, whereas others embrace a voluntary approach. However, there is limited evidence on the relative effectiveness of these different approaches. In an interactive online experiment conducted on 731 subjects representative of the adult US population in terms of sex and region of residence, we find there is a clear ranking. A fully mandatory program is better than an optional one, and an optional system is better than no intervention at all. The ranking is driven by reductions in infections, while economic activity stays unchanged. We also find that political conservatives have higher infections and levels of economic activity, and they are less likely to participate in the contact tracing program.

Abstract

In recent years online social networks have become increasingly prominent in political campaigns and, concurrently, several countries have experienced shock election outcomes. This paper proposes a model that links these two phenomena. In our set-up, the process of learning from others on a network is influenced by confirmation bias, i.e. the tendency to ignore contrary evidence and interpret it as consistent with one's own belief. When agents pay enough attention to themselves, confirmation bias leads to slower learning in any symmetric network, and it increases polarization in society. We identify a subset of agents that become more/less influential with confirmation bias. The socially optimal network structure depends critically on the information available to the social planner. When she cannot observe agents' beliefs, the optimal network is symmetric, vertex-transitive and has no self-loops. We explore the implications of these results for electoral outcomes and media markets. Confirmation bias increases the likelihood of shock elections, and it pushes fringe media to take a more extreme ideology.